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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

HONESTY AS THE BEST POLICY

MUCH lip service is rendered to the ideal of honesty as epitomized in the late sixteenth-century statement of Cervantes, "Honesty is the best policy," but the existence of that crisp statement has no doubt stimulated many people to act honestly. Crisp statements which embody fundamental truth are important for civilization—they are easily remembered, easily communicated, and easily grasped by average persons. Such statements therefore have slogan value—in teaching the young, or in reminding adults to be more circumspect. In any system of social relationships it is easy to see truth and import in Cervantes' statement. Ideals of long standing may in practice gradually degenerate, however, particularly if social relationships become more complex and older or simpler applications of the ideal fade out of the culture. Hence ideals must occasionally be re-thought with attention given to current applications.

In an interdependent society the livelihood of each person depends on others. Promises and agreements thus become important, so each knows what to rely on and can plan accordingly. Our most formal promises occur in contractual relationships, and we hear reference to the enforcement of contracts—and to "the sanctity of contracts." Enforcement implies an enforcing agency, which means that the community as a whole is interested that promises between individuals be kept—between persons recognized as competent to contract, and concerning subject-matter recognized as legitimate. Social stability and continuity increase as persons make agreements concerning future activities, and feel that the agreements will be carried out. A society which involves many different kinds of possible contacts must have many regulations for enforcing agreements. Fidelity to promises and fair dealing with fellow man are in fact so important for community welfare that it has been said that honesty not only is the best policy but the only policy on which a complex society can function—nationally or internationally, and that where community enforcement of such promises is absent organized society disintegrates. There are of course many kinds of promises and social expectations which are

not sufficiently important to be regulated by law—enforced by gossip, epithet, and similar forms of social ostracism, rather than by legal machinery.

The value of community enforcement of promises and contracts is obvious, as is the immediate advantage of planning based on contracts. Hence men tend to extend plans ever further into the future, but often fail to realize that through extension the number of unpredictable factors increases. Thus corporations sometimes incur debts and plan for developments which cover several generations. One can question the capacity of engineers or others to plan in detail for a half century, without regarding it as mere excess ego that makes men think they can see ahead clearly for such a period. When the world changed little and each century was essentially like preceding ones, such planning might have been easy. However, general education, scientific research, and invention speed up the rate of change and make social prediction more complicated. Prediction accordingly becomes more unreliable—unless predictors keep pace with change through increasing the number and distribution of the samples of evidence on which predictions are based. When man's ego and willingness to make long-time commitments outdistance his insight into social change, he will likely prove unable to keep some of his promises. If this situation is confined to a few individuals we may have local bankruptcies; if it becomes nation-wide depression and panic may appear. If organization develops among persons who can not meet economic obligations—can not keep their promises, we hear cries for scaling down debts, a moratorium on mortgage foreclosures, a commodity dollar—"rubber dollar." Governments under similar circumstances may repudiate debts, inflate the currency, ignore international treaties—economic or other—and in added ways reflect incapacity and unwillingness to live up to their promises. Is honesty the best policy in such cases, even though a literal performance of obligations might ruin the individual or nation economically or otherwise? Similar situations appear in non-economic fields—e.g., a surgeon who promises a patient that the latter will be out of bed within a short time, but unforeseen complications arise; a couple who promise to marry each other, but never get to the altar; powerful nations which guarantee the "open door" to a weak but potentially rich nation (China) but fail to keep the promise. If a "change of mind" in such cases is not considered dishonest but is socially approved, then is the way opened for denying any obligation that proves *inconvenient*—for a disintegration of moral integrity in the field of promises, contracts, and related spheres in which honesty operates? Is honesty an absolute,

or is it relative to the particular circumstances within which promises are made?

In the foregoing predicament some help might arise from differentiating honesty as intent from honesty as action. Motive and intention may be the most stable aspects of an ideal, with behavior changing according to material circumstances. However, no ideal can be cherished by society as a guiding light, if it purports to lead people to do what is impossible—whether honesty, brotherly love, patriotism, or some other ideal. Are circumstances greatly different if events which are beyond the control of individuals, or beyond the foresight of ordinary prudent men who incur obligations, make it impossible for them to fulfill their obligations? But if honesty as an ideal must be revamped whenever critical circumstances arise, is it only a fair-weather ideal? If such "adjustment" and "modification" of relationships and obligations previously agreed upon is an accepted practice, is the stability and continuity which society achieves through planning and agreement undermined—leaving a gap for disreputable persons? One might when incurring obligations intend to devote a stipulated *proportion* of his time, energy, or financial resources to those obligations, but circumstances may so change that the absolute amount available becomes less than he expected—although the intention regarding the proportion remains the same. Much here depends on how large a percentage of the population, or of the influential people, will be benefited by an adjustment program. Where only a few would be ruined by a rigid enforcement of promises, the majority who would lose by any program of adjustment are likely to conclude that these few are reckless fools who should be disciplined by the results of their commitments. Indeed society would have little stability if everybody could at will escape unpleasant obligations. However, if the many are in a predicament, the situation is because of that fact considered unusual—social pressure makes it necessary to adjudge it a calamity which no ordinary insight could foresee and for which no individual should be held responsible. In democracies this pressure manifests itself through a vote; if there is no opportunity to gain relief by vote, mobs arise. Whether "adjustment" and "modification" appear honest and upright, therefore, seems to depend largely on whether major pressures favor it—are benefited by it. Major pressures may mean a majority vote, or a minority in powerful positions. Then does might make right—with slight qualification depending on the way in which the might is exercised?

The form of ethical maneuvering known as "white lies" sometimes results from obvious conflicts in ideals—although there may

be shading off in color. Honesty might, for example, conflict with political ideals, humanitarianism, self-preservation, or kindness to others. Probably most adults have faced such conflicts. Are there times when a physician is more kind if he lies to a sick man about the latter's condition, than if stark truth is told? Presumably the man is less disturbed emotionally if he does not know how badly off he is—and emotional disturbance would delay prospects of improvement. Is there a place for "white lies," even if one grants that they are most common relative to persons with insufficient moral courage to face distasteful truth? If it seems possible that anyone may at times be in such a weakened physical or mental condition that discouraging truth would jeopardize his chances of living, should such people survive or would society be better off if only those survived who could endure truth however unfavorable its implications might be? The answers here depend largely on one's philosophy—possibly on whether one has a biological or a sociological outlook. The extent to which one can face discomforting truth can, of course, be influenced by experience, but in any crisis more energy is consumed than in the absence of crisis—emotions commonly increase the load on the heart. Yet if "white lies" as a category are admissible, can society control the scruples of persons who are in the position to soil the whiteness for selfish ends? What has been said relative to the example of the physician may apply in other connections. Should it apply to the prime minister of a great empire who says "Give us the tools and we'll finish the job," at a time when a reflective layman would have to conclude that the empire had not yet really got started on the job, and that in addition to being supplied with the tools the empire would have to be supplied with somebody to use them? Should it apply to the president of a great republic if he promises mothers in his nation that their sons will not have to fight on foreign soil, at a time when lay insight would point to such fighting as the most effective way to protect the homeland? Are there times when the whole population as a social group is in such a "weakened" condition morally that "white" or other lies are better for it than truth? The statements regarding who deserves to survive, and training for survival, seem as pertinent here as in the illustration concerning physician and patient.

References to honesty which have been made up to this point have been concerned primarily with one's honesty in one's relationships with other persons. In society much is said about one's being honest with himself, of which some notice should here be taken. Dishonesty in relationships with others may usually reflect weakness in the dishonest person, but dishonesty regarding oneself

seems always to reflect weakness. From a rationalization and escape mechanism which may in its initial stages be consciously employed, responses in which one is dishonest to himself may become habit. When one finds that he does not get along in the world as well as others whom he notices, it is easy for him to conclude that the trouble is not with himself but perhaps with the home through which he got started in life, with "vested interests," with "politics," the war, or perhaps with God—it is easy because when he can locate the trouble outside himself and beyond his control, he feels no need to do anything about it except complain. However, to recognize that the trouble is within oneself and still to be content in doing nothing about it, reflects a substantially lower order of self-respect than to refrain from exerting oneself when the idea seems convincing that he has no capacity to modify circumstances. It is unlikely that anyone consciously sets about or "intends" to deceive or be dishonest with himself—if he proceeded thus there would be no deception. However, through escape mechanisms, unanalytical responses, and other ways of yielding to immediate and transient satisfactions at the expense of the personal discipline and self-criticism necessary to pick apart one's best current efforts in the hope of possible improvement, one can gradually build up a system of self-deceptions and habits of dishonesty concerning himself. A point regarding self-deception which is less pertinent in regard to deceiving others is that one has fewer checks on himself. One's deceptive activities regarding others are from time to time likely to be brought vigorously to his attention by those deceived, whereas few people will be sufficiently concerned about one's deception of himself to do anything about it. Thus he loses the sobering effect of being caught in a lie. The same situation is reflected by saying that society is little interested in enforcing promises which one makes to himself, or in setting up regulations concerning the areas of human interest in which he might make promises to himself. Since organized society helps less, it may often be more difficult for one to be honest with himself than to be honest with others.

From the foregoing pages it seems that honesty as an ideal should be relative. A trait might be a virtue in one circumstance or degree, but not in another. A person who made a fetish of honesty or of patriotism or of humanitarianism, but who reflected only the single virtue, could hardly be an asset to mankind. Even some dictators with criminal intentions have been sufficiently bold and honest in stating their intentions as to startle the world, when one could not consider their net influence to be beneficial to mankind. We inevitably act and do our thinking in a world of rela-

tionships—among people and physical objects, as well as among ideas, attitudes, and ideals. When people, objects, or ideals exist in relationship each must in part be described or explained in terms of the others—no one has meaning alone. Honesty, like any other trait, does not function in a vacuum; it functions or applies in concrete situations. The references to physicians, economic adjustments, and other illustrations indicate that different traits or ideals function in the same situations in which honesty functions. Thus one's intention as well as his action regarding any particular situation is the resultant of several forces, which support or conflict with one another in varying degrees. Even if one thinks of a personality that seems "dominated" by a particular trait, other traits influence the functioning of this particular trait.

The foregoing view implies greater difficulty in the development of ideals than would be implied if one assumed that ideals existed in separate compartments with no relationships among them—as perception, memory, etc., were once thought of as compartmentalized aspects of knowledge. When an ideal always functions in relationship with other ideals, one in any training effort is dealing with an ideal-complex, not an isolated ideal. More specifically in regard to honesty, one is then confronted with such questions as: When is honesty the best policy? Honesty up to what point? What is the situation when honesty conflicts with self-preservation, humanitarianism, patriotism, or religious devotion?

From the standpoint of practical achievement in the field of virtue one might then ask if more might not be achieved through guiding children and youth—in school and elsewhere—into an analytical approach to such an ideal as honesty, noting its limitations as well as its values so far as the present-day world is concerned, than through holding up the ideal by means of our formal teaching efforts as an isolated but infallible guide to human welfare when even young children can see that many people profess one thing regarding the ideal and do another. To asume that the individual can recognize the shortcomings of his ideals, or of heroes who embody them, and yet recognize their value as guides to conduct, attributes more dignity, respectability, and judgment to the individual than to think of him as capable only of accepting or rejecting in toto—with no discrimination. To help the individual develop such capacity to discriminate should be a fruitful way of developing stability of personality.

Since the public school is one of our chief public agencies for training children and youth, many people think of social change in the field of ethics and morality as a problem of public education. The school is important—although there are other agencies, but the

possibilities of the schools seem adequately understood so that they need no detailed examination here.

Since the aspects of honesty being discussed have related substantially to keeping promises and meeting contractual obligations, in seeking possible avenues of improvement attention might be directed toward our courts—a social agency which enforces promises. If a relative or "adjustment" view regarding promises and obligations is allowable, courts of equity might become more important than heretofore in teaching the principles of mediation and of justice relative to changing circumstances—equity in the sense that judgment is based on general practices, customs, and conceptions of fair dealing among men, without specific dependence by the judge on particular provisions of statutes or of written contracts. Anyone, however, who would look to such courts as agencies of possibly increased educational importance in the field considered should note that at present many judges are lacking in range of information and imagination, as well as in freedom from the compulsions of their own vested interests. Research assistants of various kinds can help remedy the first shortcoming; improvement regarding the second is more difficult—but should not be impossible. While the function of a court is not primarily that of education, there should be no objection to using it more extensively for education in a field to which it may seem peculiarly suited, so long as its primary function is not impaired—any society should feel free to use its institutions according to *its* needs and *their* capacities, or to create new institutions.

HAROLD H. PUNKE

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RESPONSIBILITIES OF PHILOSOPHY TODAY

THE responsibility for the present confusion in philosophy is widespread; the whole educational world is involved. But the share of that responsibility which should be placed at the door of the philosophers is especially large, and we will do well to face the question as to why we are playing so inadequate a rôle. There are at least two characteristics of philosophy—true, also, of modern education as a whole, which help to give an answer.

Philosophy has, in the first place, been largely concerned with the achievements of the past. As one surveys our philosophical courses the percentage that are historical in nature is astonishing. I suppose that few of us need to have the value of history demonstrated. When Mr. Ford says that history is bunk we are inclined

to think that the comment is fully as illuminating of Mr. Ford as it is of history. We would agree with Santayana that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Yet so often we seem to take the attitude that the past is worth studying just for its own sake; we have become contemporary students of the past, rather than historically-minded students of the present. Sometimes we have defended our historical work on the score that it clarifies the present. But if that is the case then it seems to me that men are justified in demanding of us that we make clear *what* it is that is being illuminated. We need some principle of selection by which we may determine what material is significant, some basis by which we can find the issues upon which we need the perspective of the past.

There are some lines of Archibald MacLeish which are worth pondering. "We have learned all the answers, all the answers. It is the questions that we do not know." This is a profoundly true characterization of contemporary philosophy. We know, or think we know, the answers, all the answers, and we are more than willing to pass them out to our students. The only trouble is that so many of the questions are no longer important; they aren't worth asking or answering. And the reason why we so often put the irrelevant question is just because we have forgotten that it is only out of the present, with all its uncertainties and urgencies and conflicts, that the vital questions can arise. The danger of the study of the past is that we will let *it* determine the issues to be explored, rather than turning to it for part of the answer to the questions that have emerged from the here and now. For if the present without the past is blind, the past without the present is trivial. The philosopher's concern with times past is frequently little more than an academic pastime.

A second characteristic of philosophy, and modern education too, is its determination to be primarily descriptive. Descriptive objectivity has been the goal. It has envisaged its task as the description of a process, not its evaluation; to show how it operates, not to judge of its worth. Philosophers are apt to hold the scientists responsible for this trend. Not that philosophers have usually made a wholesale condemnation of science. Its profoundly civilizing effect upon life is obvious. Situations which men faced with hopeless fear have been brought under control. And the scientific spirit has given a respect for fact which has been, and still is, desperately needed. None the less, from the beginning of modern science it was felt that there must be a drastic separation of fact and value. Prediction came to be the test and controls the end, and in neither case was there need for any critical evaluation. The

method with its resulting solutions of specific problems became the only goal, and increasingly the scientist disclaimed responsibility for the ends which he was furthering. Not for him, as scientist, was there any obligation to enter the discussion of the moral implications of his work. His business was to explore and describe the process: that was his supreme value.

A similar professionalism spread to the other areas of thought and activity. Men felt themselves specialists in *means* but amateurs in *ends*. They knew they were expert in the one: they suspected that no one could even be competent in the other. And so their ideal became a repudiation of any genuine ideal, any long-run evaluation.

Even the social scientists disavowed a concern with values or ends. We have had descriptive sociologists. Economists have sought to discover the "laws" of economics. In dealing with the operation of an industrial system many of them have been concerned not with what ought to be, but with what is. We are each in our separate realms specialists in the means of reaching goals about which most of us are sceptical, if not indeed profoundly fearful.

As a result of this descriptive, professional attitude the moral values of our civilization are isolated; they have been removed from the realm of the business man and politician and have been turned over to the clergyman and the philosopher. And then because men have realized how remote those professions in practice are from the active areas of life they naturally have had little confidence in the capacity of either philosophers or clergymen to formulate ideals that were practical. They have viewed men in those professions with a mixture of tolerant suspicion and awed respect—as befits those who deal with the mysterious. The very word "idealism" has come to connote impracticability, and an idealist, who, after all, is a man who seeks the perspective of the widest outlook, and asks to what end we are moving, is considered a dreamer.

The obvious effect of banishing values from the laboratory and the classroom is to emphasize the fact that they are also intruders in the factories and business houses. I know of no clearer evidence of this split between the values by which we live and the ones we profess than in our use of the word "good." A "good" man is honest, generous, and humble. A good business man is effective, covetous, and proud. We have given lip service to traditional values; we have lived by uncriticized practices, not realizing that there is no surer way to the destruction of a civilization than to

allow a gulf to widen between the values men praise and the ones by which they live.

But is this a criticism of philosophy? In a sense, no. We have been concerned with values at two points. We have described them; we have been historians of the standards which men have had in the past. Our students have known the ends which Plato, Augustine, and Hegel have defended. In the second place, we have been analysts of value theory. We have attempted to lay a basis by which men could intelligently criticize their values. Both of these activities are valid, but they have left one area largely untouched. I am referring to the formulation of the ends and values which will give direction in our own day. We have assumed that if we illustrated the search from the past, and gave a critical analysis of how the quest might now be carried on, that was all that was needed. Let some one else define in concrete terms the ends for our own day.

If one wants to see this tendency at work, look over a selection of texts in ethics. There is ample material on the history of ethical speculation; there is endless analysis of "principles," utilitarian, idealistic, etc. But when all the pages are added up there is startlingly little light for student or teacher on the ethical problems of our day. In all soberness do we really think that all the endless courses taught on the campuses in the field of ethics have altered to any considerable degree the attitudes of our graduates? Professor Paul Douglass in an article published some years ago suggested that we review the results of modern education and decide whether they were what we had expected. He used as an illustration the attitude of economists toward free trade. For seventy years the great majority have been teaching low tariffs or none at all. During that time at least a million students have passed through their classes. It is also during that time that tariffs were raised to the highest point in history, and, added Professor Douglass, it was done largely by college-trained men. How far have similar social abuses been the work of men actually trained in our ethics classes?

We, too, have clung to the ideals of objective and descriptive scholarship, not caring to enter the arenas where issues of right and wrong are fought out, and the world has naturally preferred to follow those who were at least effective. Students might have heeded depth of conviction and moral passion, but they heard little of it in our academic halls. In defense of philosophy, we have agreed with Hegel that the owl of Minerva only took its flight at twilight, that the critical work of the philosopher could only be played after the work of the world was done. This may guarantee

a safe and scholarly life, but it is not surprising if once in a while we should glance out of our classrooms a little wistfully, wishing that we might sometimes see the sun rise and participate as workers in the business of the world.

We have also justified our profession on the score that it furnished a discipline in clear thinking, that there is a transfer of training, and that men educated in philosophy are better able to analyze all questions. This may be so, though I often wonder why we are not more concerned to make an empirical examination of the results of our teaching to determine whether we are actually accomplishing what we have supposed we were doing. But if we do admit that there is a transfer it must be clear that we have opened the door to the conclusion that other areas may also provide that training. And it will not be surprising if students turn increasingly to other material for a discipline in logical thinking.

I wonder if we have not been indulging in a little self-illusion. We have liked to believe that our primary values were scholarship and courageous intellectual honesty. Is that true? Are those the things we have cared most for? If they were why have we not fought for them more vigorously when they were threatened? I know of no more surprising fact than the apathy of most teachers in the face of violations of civil liberties. We have the A. A. U. P. for our own protection, but when it comes to the defense of minorities who are demanding the right to be heard in political and industrial disputes professors as a rule are distinguished by their absence. Are scholarship and intellectual integrity the things that matter most to us? Or are they security, and comfort, and the respect of the dominant classes? These may be good reasons; a vital education (and that includes philosophy) will be allied not with the *status quo* but with those forces that are on the march. But the stakes of great educational institutions are in the existing order, and if we forget that, there will be those willing to remind us. Was Emerson right in insisting that "there can be no scholar without the heroic mind," and would he have found in our lack of courage a dominant reason for the futility of philosophy and the failure of education?

What then is the place of philosophy in contemporary society? If it is to play a vital rôle there must be an acceptance of at least four points.[1]

[1] In a somewhat different form these points were presented to the regional meeting called in Chicago by the Commission on the Rôle of Philosophy in Liberal Education. They were formulated in part, and criticized, by Professors Otto, Fries, Geiger, and Brameld, though only the writer is responsible for them. The latter would like to make clear his indebtedness to the meetings of the Commission for the stimulus which he received.

1. *Philosophy does not belong to the philosophers.* Scientists have never felt that science was an esoteric activity limited to professional scientists. So, too, with philosophy; it is not the exclusive possession of professionals. To paraphrase a remark of Eric Gill: The philosopher is not a special kind of man, but every man is a special kind of philosopher. It might be added that some are distinctly better than others, but none the less all men to some degree engage in philosophic speculation. And our aim is to enlarge the area of philosophical thought.

2. *The distinctive enterprise of philosophy is the critical clarification of underlying assumptions in all areas of activity and thought, together with the interpretation of the various fields of study.* Philosophy, in other words, has a method which is not strikingly different from that used wherever men think: its only major distinctiveness lies in the fact that it persists after the others have stopped. It questions the presuppositions commonly taken for granted, and tries to correlate the answers from the various fields.

The five-year-old son of a philosopher was overheard discussing his father's profession with a small girl. She was obviously puzzled and finally asked: "But what is philosophy?" to which the boy replied: "It's words." That stopped her for only a minute, and then she came back: "Yes, but what words?" This time there was no hesitation in the reply: "He says 'why?'" No better definition could have been given. The philosopher is a man who continues to ask "why" when others have stopped.

But sometimes men put the question "why" about a choice. Why did they go this way instead of that; in which direction should they now move? At that point the questions concern the realm of values; that structure by which we decide which are the things that matter, by which we sort out the trivial from the important, by which we determine the right from the wrong. When men persistently philosophize they must examine their choices and therefore their values; they must evaluate. For philosophers everywhere the unexamined life is not worth living, and that applies particularly to their ends and values.

3. *Not all problems are equally important. There is a priority to be determined in terms of the basic conflicts in the contemporary scene.* It has sometimes been said that to the scholar all issues are equally important. What is not always seen is that the corollary of that proposition is that all issues are equally unimportant. *Sub species aeternitatis* all things may seem of equal significance, but in a world lit by falling flares and bombs there are some things for which not even a Calvinist theologian would give a damn.

The criterion is clear; importance is in direct proportion to the depth of the conflict. For it is that which reveals the loss of any common body of values, the destruction of any common goals toward which men might move together.

The issues with which we have largely concerned ourselves in philosophy have, as I have suggested, all too often emerged from another age, as, for example, the impact of science upon religion. The problem is a real one, of course, and it is by no means solved. But that is not the issue that matters most at the present, nor is that the area where the most bitter conflict rages. We have clung to that and similar questions; on those issues we have divided ourselves into idealists, realists, and pragmatists, and we have carried on a battle as important to us as, in many respects, it was unimportant to our students. Of course, some of these questions are bound to persist, and rightly so. Issues also in the field of epistemology, metaphysics, etc., are going to continue. But if they are to be significant they will emerge out of the context of our own living tensions—not out of those of another day.

This principle is not intended as a strait-jacket. Christopher Morley somewhere says that the Ten Commandments are not really commandments but that they are valuable suggestions. Men must be left free to decide for themselves where the areas of greatest conflict are. But it is an insistence that for the sake of society and the philosophic enterprise, in a time of profoundest warfare on the ideological as well as physical level, philosophers shall not proudly hang out their sign: business as usual.

4. *The ends and values of society are to be evolved in the process of resolving those conflicts, and are to be formulated in terms of achievable means.* This obviously requires those who philosophize to be concerned deeply with the social conflicts, have an understanding of the causes, and take responsibility for their resolution. It is an insistence that the goals shall be formulated not in some *a priori* vacuum, but in the very process of working out the conflicts; that the ends shall be defined in terms of the achievable possibilities while the means adopted shall not be such as to destroy the ends.

> Show us not the aim without the way,
> For ends and means on earth are so entangled
> That changing one, you change the other, too;
> Each different path brings other ends in view.[2]

This is not to say that the philosopher must be a labor leader or a fighter for civil liberties (though he would probably be the better philosopher for it), but it does say that only those pro-

[2] By Ferdinand Lassalle. Quoted by Arthur Koestler in *Darkness at Noon.*

foundly aware of the situation and its possibilities for good and ill, and deeply concerned about it, can fruitfully evaluate our goals.

We have said that we must put the question "why?" to the issues of right and wrong. But we will have to recognize that these problems of value do not belong to some transcendent realm, but to the empirical world within which we operate, question, and experiment. And the solutions will arise out of the process as we critically evaluate it: they will not be intuitive importations from some realm of absolutes.

Here, then, is a platform for philosophers. It could not be better summarized than in a brief statement written by Professor Otto:

> To define and illuminate the basic conflicts of the time as these are present in the life of society and the individuals; to bring knowledge of philosophy and philosophic insight and method to bear upon these conflicts, attitudes and views; to help develop in those who study philosophy a deeper and broader understanding of the human undertaking, and to stimulate in them a more intelligent and vital concern for the achievement of the happiest and noblest life for all men and women everywhere.

If the peculiar function of philosophy is the clarification of our ends and values, then surely there could never have been a day when there was greater opportunity and need for it. From every side is coming the evidence of confusion. And the war, instead of giving us at least a temporary goal, has only increased our bewilderment as a people. We may know who we are against: we do not have any unity as to what we are for. Only individual frustration and social catastrophe can await a society so uncertain of its goals.

As philosophers have faced the necessity of formulating the values by which men could live they have found a dilemma around which controversies have raged, and which may well be the crucial issue for our time. On the one hand are those whose values are so tentatively held that they have no basis by which they can defend them or explore and expose competing systems. On the other hand are the absolutists who speak with the assurance of divinity, and whose only interest in meeting other values is to exterminate them, gently or otherwise. It is the situation of pre-Hitler Germany with an ethical relativism that was essentially nihilism, and of Hitlerian Germany where there was an absolutism that found its logical fulfillment in the tortures of a Brown House. Our task is the formulation of values final enough for loyalty and devotion, yet relative enough to submit to rational examination in terms of the concrete solutions.

Society without philosophy is blind and lost, even as our own society is; philosophy without a social context is trivial, even as so much of our philosophy is. What Dewey said of art we may say of philosophy; so long as it is the beauty parlor of civilization neither philosophy nor civilization are secure. It is hard to see how a philosophy that is without significance can escape being an insignificant philosophy.

On that basis we can locate our genuine agreements and differences. There can be no basic disagreements between men who can work together; obviously their ends are similar. We can tolerate and welcome all those who are seeking whole-heartedly a solution for the crisis of our times. The profound difference lies between those who are concerned with the present situation and those who are not. Our genuine differences are with those whose eyes are turned primarily to the past so that it is there they live; who are not sufficiently concerned about the present to do anything about it; who are the apologists for the existing order; who would rather prettify an unsound structure than rebuild its foundations. These are differences far more profound than many represented in philosophic controversy, and it is in this area that we will find the issues which are significant for philosophers and for society.

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TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION OF THE *A PRIORI*

IN a recent note [1] David L. Miller raises the problem of the relationship, in C. I. Lewis's theory of the categories, between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. As Miller points out, Lewis's doctrines might give one to suppose that, since man formulates the prescriptive categories of knowledge, "such formulation is altogether arbitrary"; [2] that "there are two types of knowledge, the purely *a priori* and the *a posteriori*, and that these types are actually separable"; [3] that "experience and the *a priori* are entirely and necessarily separated." [4] If Lewis's doctrines seem to support these conclusions, would Lewis himself, then, consent to them? What, exactly, does Lewis himself say? What, so far as we can find out, does Lewis himself mean? Certain of his doctrines, we

[1] "Prescriptive Categories in Modern Science," this JOURNAL, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 411–414.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 412.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 413.

[4] *Ibid.*

believe, lead definitely in a direction more promising than that which Miller so rightly criticizes.

A category, according to Lewis, "prescribes *nothing* to the content of experience." [5] And yet, he also claims, "the principles of categorial interpretation are a priori valid of all possible experience." [6] The resolution of this paradox constitutes, in the main, Lewis's theory of the categories. Briefly: The categories are *a priori* principles; that is, they are valid for all possible experience. Now synthetic propositions, being empirical generalizations, remain always subject to future invalidation. Hence *a priori* principles are, in the nature of the case, analytical. Their service is to define reality. And categories are those basic *a priori* concepts which determine "major classes of the real." [7] Categories hold of all possible experience just because, asserting nothing about experience, they can not possibly be invalidated by future experience. "Any experience not in conformity, which might be evidence against them, is automatically thrown out of court as not veridical in that category, and hence not pertinent to them." [8] In other words a category prescribes only what one shall regard as reality—reality not in general, but of some particular sort; and "what is not reality of one sort is reality of another." [9]

The crux of Lewis's whole theory of the categories lies in the relationship between the *a priori* and empirical generalizations. In some places Lewis speaks as though the *a priori* were only an empirical generalization functioning as definitive of reality. It is paradoxical, he says, for instance, that "principles of the order of natural law are reached by some generalization from experience—that is, from *veridical* experience," since that experience has already been determined as veridical by the criterion of law; however, "the law is first precisely so long as and so far as we are prepared to maintain it as criterion of the real." [10] From this passage it would appear that, even if the *a priori* defines veridical experience, it is itself derived from veridical experience as, originally, an empirical generalization. And Lewis goes on to insist that "all concepts, and not simply those we should call 'categories,' function as criteria of reality. . . . Furthermore, what is a priori criterion of reality in one connection may be merely

[5] *Mind and the World-Order* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 197.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 227.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 227.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 262.

empirical law in some other. . . ." [11] But what, then, for Lewis, is the distinction between those concepts which are *a priori* and those concepts which are not *a priori*? Empirical concepts, merely as such, could not constitute coercive criteria of reality. Or does Lewis believe that all concepts are *a priori* and that empirical generalizations, therefore, are not concepts? He gives no indication, so far as we know, that he ever wishes to define "concept" in such a fashion as to exclude the possibility of empirical concepts. Does Lewis mean, perhaps, as one might infer from some passages,[12] that *a priori* concepts define reality with "a constraint imposed by the mind," while other concepts define reality without constraint?

The most intelligible interpretation we can suggest is, certainly, this: that an *a priori* concept is a concept employed in a certain way, that it is to be defined by its function and not by any intrinsic nature. But against this interpretation we must acknowledge various counter-indications, of which the most important, we believe, is Lewis's doctrine that the alternative to an *a priori* "is not its falsity but merely its abandonment in favor of some other," inasmuch as an *a priori* is only a definition or a rule.[13] And we do not think that anyone could speak in this manner, both consistently and coherently, of an empirical generalization even when serving as an *a priori*. The alternative to an empirical generalization is, indeed, its abandonment, but its abandonment as a *false* generalization. This Lewis admits (though he seems actually to deny it elsewhere [14]) in the statement that "nobody has ever supposed that what were only hypotheses or empirical generalizations of a high degree of probability were incapable of being disproven by new facts. To the extent that newly discovered empirical evidence may render old principles theoretically impossible, the old truth never was anything but hypothesis and is now proved flatly false." [15] As against Lewis's usual contention, we should urge that the abandonment of an *a priori* concept follows likewise from its recognition as a false empirical generalization. And the successor to an abandoned *a priori* is, we should say, regarded as more satisfactorily definitive of the real because it is regarded as corresponding, at last, with the actual character and disposition of things. Lewis himself appears to admit our suggestion in the statement,

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 262 f.

[12] As on page 197.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[14] As, for instance, on page 332.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 271. Conceivably the word "only" and the phrase "theoretically impossible" might be intended so to qualify the statement that it does not mean at all what we take it to mean; but we do not know how otherwise to take it than at its face value.

remarkable in the context of his general theory, that, "if definition is unsuccessful, as early scientific definitions have been, it is because the classification thus set up *corresponds with no natural cleavage* and does not correlate with sufficiently important uniformities of behavior." [16]

At one point Lewis explicitly attempts to distinguish between the *a priori* proposition and the empirical generalization. He explains that the former, as definitive, is analytic, while the latter is synthetic. With the former, he says, "the applicability of the predicate term is logically requisite to the applicability of the subject"; while with the latter the predicate term "is not included as essential in the denotation assigned" to the subject.[17] But this distinction hardly touches the problem in hand. Does Lewis mean, perhaps, that between the analytic proposition and the synthetic proposition there exists an intrinsic difference, so that the analytic proposition is always analytic and the synthetic proposition always synthetic? Or does he mean, on the contrary, that whether a proposition is analytic or synthetic depends on the attitude that one takes toward it? In illustrating his discussion with the propositions that "all swans are birds" and "all swans are white," Lewis seems to intend the former alternative; there is no hint of the opinion that such propositions could be taken at will as either synthetic or analytic. And when he declares that "the empirical generalization is forever at the mercy of future experience, and hence probable only, while the a priori proposition is forever certain," [18] his acceptance of the first alternative appears still more likely. In such event, however, his assertion that "what is a priori criterion of reality in one connection may be merely empirical law in some other" remains without explanation.

In short, Lewis evidently takes two positions, each of which possesses its own good ground. On the one hand, he wants above all to fend off the attacks of skepticism, and to do this he feels it necessary to insist that categories prescribe nothing whatsoever to experience. On the other hand, however, at least some categories do arise in experience as empirical generalizations, and he candidly recognizes the fact.

Now, so far as we can see, there is but one way to resolve the equivocation satisfactorily—namely, to hold that it is indeed the attitude one takes toward a proposition that makes the proposition analytic or synthetic. We have already shown that Lewis himself sometimes tends toward this position, and our evidence seems to

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 257; our italics.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 302 f.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 303.

gain confirmation from the statement that "the difference between essential and non-essential properties, and between prescriptive laws and empirical generalizations, is one determined by pragmatic considerations of the particular interests our knowledge is to serve which dictate particular modes of analysis, rather than by any difference in the objective state of affairs upon which these are directed." [19]

Certainly we should agree that the distinction between an analytic and a synthetic, between an *a priori* and an *a posteriori* proposition, between law and empirical generalization, between categorial structure and tentative interpretation, depends on the attitude of the subject. But of the specific position which Lewis appears to imply, we have two criticisms: that the pragmatic formulation would conceal the true functional nature of the criterion and that it would deny that relevance to objectivity which the criterion actually possesses. First, as we see the situation, it demands the view that the *a priori*, whatever its origin, is what one *takes as* criterion of the real; that the analytic proposition, whatever its origin, is what functions *as if* the predicate term were essential to the denotation of the subject. It is the manner in which concepts function that makes them *a priori* and categorial; it is the sense in which certain propositions are intended that makes them analytical. If "all swans are birds" is an *a priori* proposition, that is because we all take it as such. Second, however, we all take it as such because of its conformity to a "natural cleavage"; and so accurately does it represent a natural cleavage that we never question its analytic character. The proposition that "all swans are white" would also become an *a priori* proposition (instead of a false empirical generalization) if one were willing to refuse the name of swan to black swans. But such an attitude would not correspond to a significant natural cleavage, and this lack of correspondence provides empirical justification for the refusal to take "all swans are white" as an *a priori* and analytic proposition.

Throughout our discussion the problem of objective reference has gone hand in hand with the problem of the nature of the *a priori*. And we suggest that the reason for Lewis's failure to present a consistent and coherent functional view of the *a priori* lies precisely in his pragmatic subjectivism. The distinction between mere empirical generalizations and *a priori* concepts definitely has some relation to the depth of the subject's persuasion regarding the objectivity of the particular notions in question. It does not matter how that persuasion is arrived at: whether re-

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 375.

sultant from scientific experiment, intellectual analysis, mystical intuition, collective representation, or fundamental biotic nature. In whatever case, concepts can function apriorily only upon the presupposition of their objective validity. One might here protest that the "prescriptive categories" formulated in science are not, after all, really believed to be true, that their truth is merely entertained; or, perhaps, that the idea of truth is quite irrelevant and that the essential character is simply prescriptiveness to a system, the being a "definition" or a "rule." But we should reply that to call such prescriptive categories *a priori* is to misapply the notion of apriority. As Lewis sometimes says (though we should add the qualification, "for the time being"), the *a priori* is that which one holds to, "come what will" or "no matter what"; the *a priori* concept is distinguished from the empirical generalization, in other words, by a certain determined manner of application. But this criterion, it seems clear, is a criterion of function; and the function, it seems clear, either is partly dependent upon, or, in any event, is significantly correlated with, the persuasion of objectivity.

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BOOK REVIEW

The Aesthetic Process. BERTRAM MORRIS. (Northwestern University Studies in the Humanities, No. 8.) Evanston: Northwestern University. 1943. ix + 189 pp. $2.25.

Meandering rather than drawing straight furrows the writer ranges over the wide field of esthetics, taking up problem after problem in a loose sequence of argument, illustration, and criticism of divergent views. First he explores the two aspects of the esthetic phenomenon: its genesis in the mind (Chapter I, "The Aesthetic Attitude") and its objective manifestation (Chapter II, "The Aesthetic Object"). Chapters III through V repeat the order which leads from the mind to an objective correlate and elaborate the scheme of thought outlined in the earlier part. The discussion of the two concluding chapters, straddling over the dichotomy of subject and object, investigates the logical character of the esthetic judgment and the nature of art criticism. There is hardly a major topic of modern esthetics which does not, at some time or other, come into the shifting focus of the analysis.

With all his zigzag movements and rambling digressions, the author is bent on achieving something like a system. The unified

interpretation of art and beauty at which he aims hinges, as the title suggests, on the idea of process. Time and process, he holds, have, in all spheres of modern cultural activities, assumed a prominence which they did not enjoy at any former time (p. 2). For the philosopher who wishes to be up-to-date this is reason enough to write a book on the esthetic *process*, or, for that matter, on other processes, logical, social, political, economic, etc. It is, perhaps, an implication of the thinking in terms of process that no worthier goal can be conceived than being in tune with that general process which is "our time"; and this holds for the philosopher as well as for the artist. Justice Cardozo, the writer asserts, "voiced the spirit of art" when he defined his judicial duty as an attempt "to objectify in law, not my own aspirations and convictions and philosophies, but the aspirations and convictions and philosophies of the men and women of my time" (p. 185). Of course, this happy time-serving conformism is to be compensated for by transience. Tomorrow the men and women of my time will be "of my time" no more. They will have changed their minds, leaving me high and dry with my aspirations, convictions, philosophies—and works of art. The author warns us not to take Keats' "a joy forever" unquestionably; and he might also warn us not to set much store by the "war with Time" as waged by Shakespeare's sonnets. He considers Carl Sandburg's tearful line closer to the truth: "I cried over beautiful things knowing no beautiful thing lasts."

The reviewer is no judge as to the aspirations, convictions, and philosophies actually embraced by the men and women of the time to which Justice Cardozo and Professor Morris belong. If he were to judge on what he finds about this time in the present treatise, he would suspect it to be a badly disoriented time. Preoccupation with process, as the salient feature of a civilization, can only mean aimlessness and spell imminent disaster. Men who know what they want, or who are eager to acquire this needful knowledge, will naturally be preoccupied with aims and ends, in the twentieth century as well as in any other period. And this is so whether or not the "men and women of my time" agree. In the relativism of process, a strange timidity combines with an even stranger boldness. Its exponent must claim to know what, by its nature, can never be known; and he must refrain from affirming what is evident on the testimony of reason.

"In order to talk about beauty intelligently, one must understand the process by which it comes into being, and its place in human experience" (p. 1). This assertion may mean that a "genetic" analysis is a prerequisite for a knowledge of the "ontic"

structure of the object under consideration; in other words, that the study of the process of "coming into being" may instruct us, if only in a preliminary way, on "being." As the sequel shows, the author places a more radical interpretation on his programmatic sentence. He means to show that art and beauty exist not as static entities but as "processes," as unfolding realities. The determinate object, he writes, "is not one which is just given, but one which must be striven for. Determinate being is not achieved without an antecedent process. The process is, however, one of growing determinacy, as art is the process of progressive fulfillment. When the process comes to a conclusion, it is immanent in a different sense: as determinate and self-revealing it is what we may call the specious present" (pp. 50–51).

The expression "specious present" warns us not to detach the result from the process as if the result could stand by itself. It can not, the analysts insist. Esthetic unity, for example, "is not a sum-total of simples but is the culmination of an historical process through the embodiment of feeling" (p. 51). Even the work of art is resolved into dynamic terms by defining it as "feeling grounded in the sense-medium" (p. 67). "The genesis of the concrete, aesthetic object is to be found in feeling, and because it is the nature of feeling to run a course, feeling is consonant with activity. . . . By reason of its embodied imagination, art is neither psychopathic nor physical; it is indifferently sensitized motion or structured feeling" (pp. 46–47).

Feeling is not only a process but a directed process. The emotional urge attains to a consummate fulfillment in communicable expression—the work of art. "In this accomplishment, imagination is satisfied as a value made concrete and sharable by all who have the requisite patience and psychological disposition. In this accomplishment, a purpose is expressed in a sensuous medium" (p. 76). "Purpose," in this context, does not mean "a set purpose which is intellectually anticipated in advance of it" (p. 78). Esthetic purpose is merely another term for the completion of the process of expression, and as such it "is aesthetically intelligible only as sense-material and purpose coalesce in a perceived object" (p. 79).

From the standpoint of method, all this seems to mean that the genetic approach in esthetics is adequate inasmuch as it expresses the ontological status of art and beauty. Beauty, it appears, is among the objects that never "are" but are always "coming into being." The author might have given us a little more clarity on this important point. It is good to see the ontology of "the beau-

tiful" closely related to a psychology of appreciation and creation. But unless first a clear distinction between these two types of theory is made, the enterprise of esthetics is in danger of bogging down in psychological relativism. One may also deplore the failure to distinguish between process as happening or suffered on the one hand, and activity as doing or making on the other—a failure which betrays the writer into underrating the character of the work as "made." The same lacuna in the writer's argument seems responsible for a more consequential omission. Concentrating on genesis and process he forgets to note that beauty as achieved by art involves an attempt to transcend the character of life as a temporal process and to raise the experienced Now to the unique status of abiding presence.

Within its limitations, the psychological genetic analysis of "satisfied imagination" proves fruitful. The discussion of problems such as the relation of creation to appreciation, beauty in nature, the ugly, formal and material elements of beauty, is subtle and enlightening. From the first to the last line, the reader moves in an atmosphere of intellectual honesty: problems are squarely faced as they emerge, and the eagerness to arrive at clear-cut answers is wholesomely balanced by a conscientious avoidance of over-simplified solutions. The open-minded equity of the scholar happily associates with the sensitiveness of the lover of art. Morris has at his command a wealth of esthetic experiences the reflex of which enlivens every page of his book.

With all its brilliant qualities, the book seems destined alternately to please and exasperate the student. He is prevented from ever feeling completely at ease by a certain elusiveness and intricacy, by a reasoning faculty which is deft and circumspect in picking up, splitting, and recombining fine threads of thought but neither robust nor resolute in plotting out a compact argument. There is much skirmishing but no pitched battle ensues. This weakness may be explained by the lack of an articulate and comprehensive system of reference—in plain English, the lack of a philosophy. The framework, patched up with borrowings from instrumentalism, is too fragile to keep the edifice erect and firm on its foundations. The author wishes to assign to art its place in human life. But the question, what sort of a process (if process at all) human life might be, is left very much in the dark, perhaps even obfuscated a trifle more than it normally is by an adherence to short-lived modernisms.

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BOOK NOTES

Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi. Plato Arabus, Vol. II: *Alfarabius, De Platonis Philosophia.* Ediderunt FRANCISCUS ROSENTHAL ET RICHARDUS WALZER. London: The Warburg Institute. 1943. xxii + 54 pp. 18/-.

The *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi,* published under the auspices of the British Academy, the Union Académique Internationale, and the Warburg Institute, is intended to make available the source materials illustrative of the Platonic tradition during the Middle Ages. The program was announced in 1939 by Mr. Klibansky (*The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages*). Of the Latin series, one volume has been published so far (*Meno interprete Henrico Aristippo,* edited by V. Kordeuter and C. Labowsky, 1940). This is the first volume of the Arabic series actually to appear, volume one being expected in the near future. The volume contains a brief summary of Plato's philosophy by Alfarabi (tenth century), published from a Constantinople manuscript. The summary is part of a larger treatise *On Happiness* of which other sections had been known before. The Arabic text is published together with a Latin translation made by the editors. This will be most welcome to classical and medieval scholars ignorant of Arabic, such as myself. On the quality of the text and of the translation I am glad to quote a competent statement kindly sent me by Professor Arthur Jeffery of Columbia University: "So far as one can judge without seeing the sources on which the text was based, the work of editing the Arabic has been very well done; in fact I am at times quite impressed with the skill with which certain textual difficulties indicated in the notes have been solved. The Latin translation very faithfully represents the text present. I have one small hesitation, namely, that the translation is a translation of *this* text of al-Farabi, without reference to al-Farabi's other works to check on the use he makes of particular terms. However, this may be hypercritical."

The summary itself describes the content of the individual dialogues of Plato, beginning with the *First Alcibiades* and ending with the *Epistles.* It is an attempt to understand the whole of Plato's philosophy as a unified system and to assign each dialogue a specific place in the exposition of that system. The leading idea of Plato's philosophy, according to Alfarabi, is the perfection of man, that is, happiness and it is the task of the various dialogues to examine the contribution made to the attaining of happiness by the various sciences and other human activities, and to de-

termine that science which actually leads to happiness and which is conceived at the same time as philosophy and as statecraft.

Alfarabi's summary has survived only in one Arabic manuscript, and in a Hebrew abridgment of Falaguera (thirteenth century). No medieval Latin translation has been found to exist. Yet the text is of great historical interest because of its connection with ancient Platonism. As the editors in their learned introduction convincingly show, Alfarabi introduced a few modifications of his own, to be sure, but must have followed on the whole a lost Greek work of similar content translated into Syriac and then into Arabic. To judge from the conception of Plato's philosophy, this work was neither Sceptic nor Neoplatonic, but rather belonged to the broad movement now called Middle Platonism. The author of this lost work is tentatively identified by the editors with Theo of Smyrna (second century A.D.) who is said to have written a similar treatise. There are other ancient summaries of Plato's philosophy, such as Albinus' *Introduction* or the section on Plato in Diogenes Laertius. In supplementing the material contained in these other texts, Alfarabi's summary greatly adds to our knowledge of Middle Platonism and its understanding of Plato. The notes added to the Latin translation give parallel passages from other ancient authors, concerning the content and relative importance of Plato's individual dialogues. Thanks to these notes, the little volume becomes a reference work for the "fortune" of the various dialogues in late antiquity, and an important contribution to the history of Middle Platonism, in which all students of Platonism and of ancient philosophy will be greatly interested.

P. O. K.

Philosophy of Scientific Investigation. MAURICE ARTHUS. Preface to *De l'Anaphylaxie à l'Immunité,* Paris, 1921. Translated from the French, with an Introduction by Henry E. Sigerist. Foreword by Warfield T. Longcope. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1943. 26 pp. $.75.

This brief essay, originally written as a preface to a monographic study, expounds with admirable vigor and charm the conception of experimental method which was characteristic of Claude Bernard and the French school of physiology. The author was an eminent experimentalist in his own right, and occupied the chair of physiology at the University of Lausanne with unusual distinction for twenty-five years. The essay is full of wise observations on the conduct of experimental investigations, and contains much inspiring advice to those beginning their scientific careers.

The conception of experimental method which Arthus espouses lays great stress upon painstaking observation and the classification of facts, and at the same time exhibits a great distrust of theories. To be sure, the importance of hypotheses and the interpretation of facts is not minimized—but "a hypothesis is not a theory, but simply a question." Arthus seemed to fear especially the *a priori* dogmatism and the vested interests in ideas which men acquire when they commit themselves to a "theory." "Seek facts and classify them—and you will be the workmen of science. Conceive or accept theories—and you will be their politicians." But in spite of the obvious limitations of such dicta, the essay is eminently worth reading; and readers of this English version will be grateful to Professor Sigerist for having made it available to them in such an excellent translation.

E. N.

Leadership and Isolation: A Study of Personality in Inter-Personal Relations. HELEN HALL JENNINGS. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1943. xv + 232 pp. $3.00.

Here is a detailed report on a sociometric study of the social relations of girls in an institutional community. It is concerned with the quantity of "choice" (the number of girls approving, and approved by, each girl as companions), the "structure" of the social-preference system, and the various types of individuals found among the most-preferred ("leaders") and least-preferred ("isolates"). Within the limits of the sociometric method (which consists in isolating for statistical treatment a sample mode of behavior) it is a careful study.

Though the book has less general significance than its title would perhaps indicate (since "leader" is defined in a considerably more general sense than its usual one), and though some of the conclusions seem too obvious to justify the elaborate statistical devices employed to reach them, certain of the observations reported may be of some interest to the social philosopher. There was a considerable variety of personality among both leaders and isolates, but these groups showed no correlation with intelligence, age, length of stay in the institution, or physical opportunity for making acquaintances. It is suggestive that though individuals, over a period of eight months, changed position in the choice-structure, the structure as a whole remained almost constant, even to the number of leaders and isolates relative to the whole (pp. 210–211, 216).

We find some difficulty, however, in understanding and appraising the two conclusions which the author appears to regard as her

most significant. (1) She claims to have shown that the individual's "emotional expansiveness" (the number of his choices of others) is independent of his social environment (pp. 209–210). This claim is based on the findings that the "emotional expansiveness" of each of the test-individuals (*a*) was constant over the test-period and (*b*) was independent of the number of choices of him by others. But in the absence of any study of the test-individuals in other environments the claim is somewhat dogmatic. (2) She claims to have shown that "the reciprocal interplay maintaining between the individual and those in the same field *and constituting the individual's personality as the latter view him,* appears the underlying basic explanation of isolation and leadership. . . . The more significant finding is that personality *per se in so far as it is reflected in social structure* is the capacity for interplay with other personalities . . ." (p. 212; cf. pp. 217–218). Though these sentences verge upon tautology, at least part of what the author appears to mean is that the leader-status of a given person in a given society can not be predicted on the basis of general "leadership-qualities," but only by taking into account the needs of the particular society and the conditions affecting the sort of reputation the person can achieve. However, the author does not consistently adhere to this position, for her results show certain qualities common to the leaders whom she discusses, particularly an above-average emotional maturity, independence of others, and self-control (pp. 200–205). There is no attempt to suggest how far this latter observation is generalizable beyond the test-community.

MONROE AND ELIZABETH BEARDSLEY

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

OTHER NEW BOOKS AND JOURNALS

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Volume 11, No. 1. Philosophy of Science after Ten Years: Editorial. Cratylus, or an Essay on Science: *W. M. Malisoff.* "Truth, Beauty and Goodness" in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead: *A. H. Johnson.* Imperatives and Logic: *Alf Ross.* Mathematics for the Doctor in the Million: *Vassily Pavlov.* The Scientific Use of Historical Data: *Paul Meadows.*

LUMINAR. Volume VI, No. 2. Symposium sobre la filosofiá existencial. Una aproximación a la ontología de Heidegger: *W. H. Cerf.* El existencialismo: *Delfim Santos.* Esfinge, ahogo, angustia: *J. D. Garcia Bacca.* Existencialismo y esencialismo: *Jose Gaos.* La filosofía existencial: *A. Wagner De Reyna.* Origen y significado de la filosofía existencial: *Maximilian Beck.* E. S. Brightman y Emile Gouiran: *Foro Abierto.*

We print below a list of selected articles from the following publications:

RENAISSANCE. Volume 1, Fascicule 3. Hommage à Thomas Jefferson: *Gilbert Chinard.* Montaigne d'après Léon Brunschvicg: *Germaine Weill.*

FILOSOFIA Y LETRAS. No. 12, 1943. La esencia de la Filosofía (II): *W. Dilthey.* La historia en la filosofía de Scheler: *Leopoldo Zea.*

THE KENYON REVIEW. Winter, 1944. Discussion—Art and Science: *Van Meter Ames.* Art Needs a Little Separating: *J. C. Ransom.*

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL. Vol. XLII, No. 2. The Great Secularist Experiment: *H. L. Stewart.* Political Remedy for a Motiveless World: *O. W. Campbell.* The Problem of Pain as a Doctor Sees It: *E. W. Adams.* The Passing of Satan: *Edward Langton.* The Spirit of Evil: *Johan Hansson.* The Ethics of Dr. Julian Huxley: *T. K. Penniman.* A Moratorium for Christianity: *J. M. Robertson.*

THOUGHT. Volume XIX, Number 72. Personality and Reputation: *J. E. Tobin.*

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. 51, No. 1. The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement: *Gustav Bergmann* and *K. W. Spence.* The Nature of Theory Construction in Contemporary Psychology: *K. W. Spence.* If-Then Relations in Paralogics: *H. M. Johnson.*

NOTES AND NEWS

"In London on September 11, 1943, Susan Stebbing died. By her death the world has lost a vigorous philosophical intelligence, a passionate defender of justice, and a great teacher. A number of her English friends have begun to discuss plans for a memorial to her, and they are joining with Bedford College of the University of London and the Kingsley School for Girls for the purpose of raising funds to this end. It is hoped that enough money can be raised to establish a substantial scholarship for post-graduate studies in philosophy. The amount required will be large. We believe that Miss Stebbing's friends and admirers in America may wish to contribute to such a memorial to her.

"A panel in Girton College is to be carved in her memory, and the Aristotelian Society hopes to publish as a memorial a volume of essays on various subjects in which she was interested."

Contributions to the scholarship fund should be made out to Mary Evelyn Clarke, treasurer, and sent to Mrs. Ann Hook, secretary, American Committee, Susan Stebbing Memorial Scholarship Fund, 606A 3rd Street, Brooklyn 15, New York.